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Proxy Battles in the Ethics of War∗ 
Seth Lazar (ANU) & Laura Valentini (LSE) 
Draft, 30 September 2014 
 
1. Introduction  
Interest in just war theory has boomed in recent years, as a revisionist school of thought has 
challenged the orthodoxy of international law, most famously defended by Michael Walzer. 1 
These revisionist critics have targeted the two central orthodox principles governing the conduct 
of war: combatant equality and noncombatant immunity.2 The first states that combatants face 
the same permissions and constraints whether their cause is just or unjust. The second protects 
noncombatants from intentional attack. In response to these critics, some philosophers have 
defended aspects of the old orthodoxy on novel grounds.3 Revisionists counter. As things stand, 
the prospects for progress are remote.  
In this paper, we offer a way forward. We argue that exclusive focus on first-order moral 
principles—combatant equality and noncombatant immunity—has led revisionist and orthodox 
just war theorists to engage in ‘proxy battles’. Their first-order moral disagreements are traceable 
to deeper, second-order disagreements about the nature and purpose of political theory. These 
deeper disputes have been central to the broader discipline of political theory for several years; 
we aim to apply them to war, and we hope to enable a step forward.  
In particular, we focus on two second-order questions: 
 
• The ‘site’ question: Should principles of jus in bello apply to institutional design, or to 
individual conduct?  
• The ‘feasibility’ question: What real-world facts, if any, should constrain principles of jus 
in bello?  
 
In each case, our analysis comes in two parts. We first summarise the relevant debate in political 
theory, and illustrate how it underpins the controversy between revisionist and orthodox just war 
theorists. We then show how this novel framing enables advances on first-order disputes about 
war.  
                                                 
∗ We are grateful to the audience at the conference on Just War and Feasibility (ANU, July 2014) for questions and 
comments. 
1 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977); 
Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, Documents on the Laws of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
2 For example, Lionel K. McPherson, “Innocence and Responsibility in War,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34, no. 4 
(2005): 485–506; Cécile Fabre, Cosmopolitan War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Helen Frowe, Defensive 
Killing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
3 Appealing to a broadly rule consequentialist framework: Henry Shue, “Do We Need a ‘Morality of War’?,” in Just 
and Unjust Warriors The Moral and Legal Status of Soldiers, ed. David Rodin and Henry Shue (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), 87–111; Allen Buchanan, “Institutionalizing the Just War,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 34, no. 1 (January 
1, 2006): 2–38; Jeremy Waldron, Torture, Terror, and Trade-Offs: Philosophy for the White House (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010). Appealing to a contractarian framework: by Yitzhak Benbaji, “A Defense of the Traditional 
War Convention,” Ethics 118, no. 3 (April 1, 2008): 464–95; Daniel Statman, “Fabre’s Crusade for Justice: Why We 
Should Not Join,” Law and Philosophy 33, no. 3 (2014): 337–60. Appealing to a deontological framework that 
methodologically has much in common with the revisionist approach: Seth Lazar, “The Responsibility Dilemma for 
Killing in War: A Review Essay,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 38, no. 2 (2010): 180–213; Seth Lazar, Sparing Civilians: 
Moral Foundations of the Principle of Distinction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming); Patrick Emerton and 
Toby Handfield, “Order and Affray: Defensive Privileges in Warfare,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 37, no. 4 
(September 1, 2009): 382–414. 
 2 
Before we start, one caveat. While our approach should illuminate all areas of just war 
theory, in light of space constraints, we focus only on principles governing the conduct of war—
i.e., jus in bello—in particular, combatant equality and noncombatant immunity. 
2. The Site of Justice and Just War Theory 
In this section, we first outline the political theory debate on the site of justice, and then draw 
parallels with recent disputes between orthodox and revisionist just war theorists. This novel 
framing will allow us, in Section 3, to point to a number of important implications for our 
thinking about jus in bello. 
2.1 The Site of Justice 
Much contemporary political theory expounds principles of justice, which set out agents’ 
entitlements within a social system. For instance, members of a domestic society are entitled to 
equal civil and political liberties, and to a set of socio-economic opportunities. These entitlements 
are ‘requirements of justice’.  
Unsurprisingly, scholars disagree about the content of principles of justice, especially as 
regards entitlements to socio-economic goods. Some defend distributive equality, others 
distributive sufficiency, others still support whichever distribution maximally benefits the most 
deprived.4 Although much ink has been spilled on the first-order moral question of what socio-
economic justice demands, theorists of justice have also been sensitive to the equally important, 
second-order question of the ‘site of justice’: the subject to which principles of justice apply. We 
focus on this second-order debate in what follows.  
Two competing approaches have emerged, which we call ‘political’ and ‘non-political’.5 
Political approaches hold that principles of justice apply to the most important legal, political, 
and economic institutions within any given social system. Non-political approaches, by contrast, 
hold that principles of justice apply to the conduct of individual human beings. 
John Rawls is the most prominent proponent of the political approach.6 On his view, 
justice is the ‘first virtue of social institutions’, and his principles of justice—equal liberty, fair 
equality of opportunity, and the difference principle—apply to the ‘basic structure of society’, 
namely society’s main institutions. As A.J. Julius puts it, for Rawlsians,  
 
to conclude that a society is just or unjust, I don’t have to know what everyone in the society is 
doing. It’s enough that I know how the society’s institutions are arranged, or that I understand the 
basic framework that shapes its members’ interaction over time or the basic mechanisms that 
distribute them over a range of prospects for living better and worse lives.7 
 
Justice is a property of institutional systems, and its bearing on individuals’ conduct is only 
indirect. Individuals’ duties of justice derive from the institutional principles. In particular, when 
institutions are fully just, individuals’ duties of justice are exhausted by the demands institutions 
                                                 
4  Harry Frankfurt, “Equality as a Moral Ideal,” Ethics 98, no. 1 (October 1, 1987): 21–43; Richard Arneson, 
“Egalitarianism,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Summer 2013, 2013, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/egalitarianism/; Derek Parfit, “Equality and Priority,” Ratio 10, 
no. 3 (December 1, 1997): 202–21.  
5 In the literature, this contrast is also known as that between dualistic and monistic approaches to justice. See Liam 
B. Murphy, “Institutions and the Demands of Justice,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 27, no. 4 (October 1, 1998): 251–91. 
6 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). For discussion see Iris Marion Young, 
“Taking the Basic Structure Seriously,” Perspectives on Politics 4, no. 01 (March 2006): 91–97; Samuel Scheffler, “Is the 
Basic Structure Basic?,” in The Egalitarian Conscience, ed. Christine Sypnowich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006), 102–29.  
7 A. J. Julius, “Basic Structure and the Value of Equality,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 31, no. 4 (October 1, 2003): 321. 
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place on them (i.e. by the law); when institutions are unjust, individuals have duties of justice to 
reform them.  
On the political approach, individuals in a complex social system do face other moral 
demands besides these institutional ones: as friends, parents, workers and so forth.8 But these 
further demands do not conflict with those of justice; instead, justice sets the boundaries within 
which we may legitimately honour our other moral concerns.  
Philosophers like G.A. Cohen and Liam Murphy reject the political approach, arguing 
that justice applies, primarily, to individuals’ actions and behaviour:9  
 
any plausible overall political/moral view must, at the fundamental level, evaluate the justice of 
institutions with normative principles that apply also to people’s choices. We should not think of 
legal, political, and other social institutions as together constituting a separate normative realm, 
requiring separate normative first principles, but rather primarily as the means that people employ 
the better to achieve their collective political/moral goals.10 
 
On their view, in a just society every individual acts on the demands of justice that apply to him 
or her. The rules of justice embedded in institutions are, in turn, derived from the principles that 
apply to individuals. Unfortunately, non-political theorists are not fully transparent about how to 
effect this derivation. One, perhaps naïve option, would be to require institutional rules to exactly 
mirror the principles of justice for individual conduct, with no sensitivity to incentive effects.11 
We call this option naïve, however, because so arranging one’s institutions might be counter-
productive. For example, if moral principles for individuals are epistemically and/or substantively 
demanding, their direct embodiment in institutional rules will result in widespread, perhaps 
catastrophic non-compliance.  
Non-political theorists should instead design institutions that maximally conduce to 
justice in the circumstances.12 Following this instrumentalist rationale, facts about individuals’ 
expected behaviour and the general conditions of society must be considered when elaborating 
institutional rules for a legal system. 13  The resulting institutional rules will differ from 
interpersonal moral principles, but this difference is introduced to best realize the ideals behind 
those principles under real-world circumstances.  
So far, we have outlined two contrasting approaches to the site of principles of justice. 
What does the distinction between these two approaches have to offer to debates about just war 
theory, specifically about jus in bello? 
2.2 Jus in Bello and the Site of Justice 
When it comes to jus in bello, we care about all normative principles that govern the conduct of 
war, rather than norms of justice strictly conceived. Still, the site question arises all the same, and 
                                                 
8 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 262. 
9 G. A. Cohen, “Where the Action Is: On the Site of Distributive Justice,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 26, no. 1 
(January 1, 1997): 3–30; Murphy, “Institutions and the Demands of Justice.” For discussion see Miriam Ronzoni, 
“Two Concepts Of The Basic Structure, And Their Relevance To Global Justice,” Global Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric 
1 (2007): 68–85; Thomas Pogge, “On the Site of Distributive Justice: Reflections on Cohen and Murphy,” Philosophy 
& Public Affairs 29, no. 2 (April 1, 2000): 137–69. 
10 Murphy, “Institutions and the Demands of Justice,” 253. 
11 Cf. what Allen Buchanan calls the ‘mirroring view’ in the philosophy of human rights. See Allen Buchanan, The 
Heart of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 14ff. Murphy explicitly rejects this option when he 
says that his view ‘does not have the absurd implication that all morally defensible legal principles are ipso facto valid 
moral principles’. See Murphy, “Institutions and the Demands of Justice,” 254. 
12 Murphy, “Institutions and the Demands of Justice,” 254. 
13 In G.A. Cohen’s case, institutional rules would have to take into account not only justice, but also other values, in 
conjunction with contingent empirical facts. In other words, for Cohen, considerations of justice are one of many 
value-considerations factored into the design of ‘regulative rules’ for the basic structure of society. See G. A. Cohen, 
“Facts and Principles,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 31, no. 3 (2003): 211–45. 
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underpins some of the main disagreements between orthodox and revisionist just war theorists. 
Most noticeably, almost all orthodox theorists focus on the morally justified institutions to 
govern armed conflict, while almost all revisionists focus on the moral demands that apply to 
individual combatants. Conversely, orthodox theorists are typically silent on the principles that 
apply directly to combatants, while revisionists discuss institutions only cursorily.  
In what follows, we map out the logical space for different approaches to the site of jus in 
bello. As will become clear, bringing reflections on the site of justice to bear on disputes about jus 
in bello not only illuminates these disputes, but also highlights a portion of logical space so far 
unnoticed in debates about justice. For not just two, but three approaches to the site of principles 
of jus in bello present themselves: political, non-political, and mixed. We discuss each in turn. 
2.2.1 Political Approaches to Jus in Bello 
Political approaches to jus in bello specify the morally justified institutions to govern armed 
conflict, just as political approaches to justice specify morally just institutions to govern the 
distribution of entitlements. And as we have seen, the rules of a just ‘basic structure’ exhaust the 
justice-related demands applying to individuals; similarly, the rules set out in justified institutions 
for regulating armed conflict exhaust the just-war-related permissions and prohibitions applying 
to combatants.  
What is more, for political just war theorists, these permissions and prohibitions always 
correspond to what combatants ought to do all things considered. This idea can be understood in 
two ways: one could concede that interpersonal moral demands apply to combatants’ actions in 
war, but believe they are trumped by the institutional demands grounded in the laws of war; or 
one could simply deny that, in war, any other principles govern the actions of combatants, at least 
in their capacity as combatants.  
Many orthodox just war theorists endorse the political approach. There are two broad 
approaches, each defending a distinctive substantive principle for institutional design. The first 
justifies the institutions governing armed conflict on rule consequentialist grounds, by appeal to a 
general principle mandating the minimization of wrongful harm. Henry Shue most prominently 
advocates this position, which was also defended by George Mavrodes, R. B. Brandt, and more 
recently by Allen Buchanan and Ryan Jenkins.14 The second strand holds that justified laws of 
war result from a fair and mutually advantageous hypothetical contract. As it happens, the object 
of the contract corresponds to the existing laws of war, whereby combatants waive their rights 
against one another to grant each other the licence to obey the military orders of their state.15  
2.2.2 Non-Political Approaches to Jus in Bello 
Non-political approaches think jus in bello specifies moral principles that apply to individual 
combatants, and to their military and political leaders. Just like their counterparts in the socio-
economic justice debate, non-political just war theorists think we should derive the institutional 
rules governing armed conflict from interpersonal moral principles. This derivation is, in turn, 
susceptible to more or less ambitious interpretations: some think the nature and circumstances of 
conflict mean that the laws can at best approximate those principles; others think the laws of war 
should (and can) directly implement them. In either case, however, for proponents of the non-
                                                 
14 R. B. Brandt, “Utilitarianism and the Rules of War,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 1, no. 2 (1972): 145–65; Allen 
Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane, “The Preventive Use of Force: A Cosmopolitan Institutional Proposal,” Ethics 
& International Affairs 18, no. 1 (March 1, 2004): 1–22; Buchanan, “Institutionalizing the Just War”; George I. 
Mavrodes, “Conventions and the Morality of War,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 4, no. 2 (1975): 117–31; Ryan Jenkins, 
Dissertation, n.d.; Shue, “Do We Need a ‘Morality of War’?”; Janina Dill and Henry Shue, “Limiting the Killing in 
War: Military Necessity and the St. Petersburg Assumption,” Ethics & International Affairs 26, no. 03 (September 
2012): 311–33; Henry Shue, “Laws of War, Morality, and International Politics: Compliance, Stringency, and Limits,” 
Leiden Journal of International Law 26, no. 02 (June 2013): 271–92.  
15 Benbaji, “A Defense of the Traditional War Convention”; Yitzhak Benbaji, “The Moral Power of Soldiers to 
Undertake the Duty of Obedience,” Ethics 122, no. 1 (2011): 43–73; Statman, “Fabre’s Crusade for Justice.” 
 5 
political approach to jus in bello, the demands of interpersonal morality exhaust the obligations and 
permissions applying to individuals in war. 
At a first pass, the non-political approach seems to underpin the revisionist critique of 
orthodox just war theory. Many revisionist arguments challenge traditional principles of jus in bello 
by appealing to the demands of interpersonal morality. As revisionists have argued in detail, 
according to ordinary interpersonal morality, it is impossible to see how combatants advancing an 
unjust cause could be morally permitted to intentionally kill just combatants, or to kill 
noncombatants as unintended side-effects of pursuing their unjust goals.16 Combatant equality, as 
it is conceived in the laws of war, cannot track combatants’ interpersonal moral duties. There is 
more dispute over noncombatant immunity, but most revisionists think that it, too, lacks 
foundations in interpersonal morality, since noncombatants can be responsible for contributing 
to unjustified threats, and this grounds liability to be killed.17  
Some non-political just war theorists think the laws of war should replicate interpersonal 
morality. For example, David Rodin has rejected the arguments of Shue and others that those 
laws should aim to minimise wrongful harm, arguing instead that they should prohibit wrongful 
killing. 18 Helen Frowe has tentatively endorsed this thesis, arguing against licensing wrongful 
harm in order to minimise it.19 Other theorists, more sympathetic to just-war orthodoxy, have 
instead argued that the laws of war should attempt to approximate what interpersonal morality 
demands of individual combatants under real-world circumstances. This is the view of one of us, 
and of Adil Haque, which we discuss in more detail below.20  
2.2.3 Mixed Approaches to Jus in Bello 
Mixed approaches hold that different, and conflicting, principles govern the laws of war and the 
interpersonal morality of war. This means that combatants face pervasive conflicts between 
institutional (legal) permissions, prohibitions and requirements on the one hand, and their 
interpersonal (moral) counterparts on the other.  
In debates about justice, this third possibility in conceptual space has not yet surfaced. 
Political theorists of justice acknowledge demands of interpersonal morality applying to 
individuals beyond what institutional justice requires. However, they also insist that, within a fully 
just state, no conflict between these two sets of demands arises. Non-political theorists of justice, 
by contrast, hold that, at the fundamental level, principles for institutions and principles for 
individuals coincide—their normative outlook is monistic, not mixed. When it comes to jus in 
bello, though, the mixed approach is in fact rather popular, and embraced—with different 
emphases—by some revisionist and orthodox theorists alike. 
On the revisionist side, Jeff McMahan endorses a mixed approach. Acknowledging that 
straightforward legal implementation of combatants’ interpersonal moral duties and permissions 
would have bad consequences, he concludes that the principles governing the laws of war should 
                                                 
16 E.g., Jeff McMahan, “Innocence, Self-Defense and Killing in War,” Journal of Political Philosophy 2, no. 3 (1994): 
193–221; David Rodin, War and Self-Defense (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002); C. A. J. Coady, Morality and Political 
Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).  
17 McMahan, “Innocence, Self-Defense and Killing in War”; Fabre, Cosmopolitan War; Helen Frowe, “Self-Defence 
and the Principle of Non-Combatant Immunity,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 8, no. 4 (January 1, 2011): 530–46. For 
dissent, see David Rodin, ‘The Moral Inequality of Soldiers: Why Jus in Bello Asymmetry Is Half Right’, in David 
Rodin and Henry Shue (eds.), Just and Unjust Warriors: The Moral and Legal Status of Combatants (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 44-68. 
18 David Rodin, “Morality and Law in War,” in The Changing Character of War, ed. Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 446–63. 
19 Helen Frowe, The Ethics of War and Peace: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 2011), 45. In Frowe, “Self-Defence 
and the Principle of Non-Combatant Immunity,” she seems more sympathetic to the Fabre/McMahan view, 
however. 
20 Lazar, Sparing Civilians: Moral Foundations of the Principle of Distinction; Adil Haque, Morality and Law at War (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015).  
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aim to minimise wrongful harm (as per Shue, and contra Rodin).21 Cécile Fabre also expresses 
sympathy for the mixed view, on grounds similar to McMahan’s. 22 From the perspective of 
‘mixed’ revisionist theorists, when institutional and interpersonal moral demands conflict, 
interpersonal ones should very often take priority.23  
On the orthodox side, Jeremy Waldron also takes a mixed approach. He argues that the 
prohibition on intentionally attacking noncombatants is grounded in those noncombatants’ 
retention of their rights to life, while the equal permissions enjoyed by combatants on either side 
to kill one another intentionally, and to collaterally kill noncombatants in the pursuit of their 
military objectives, derive from morally justified laws of war, which minimise wrongful harm.24 
When unjust combatants’ institutional permission to kill conflicts with the interpersonal 
prohibition on doing so, Waldron thinks that the institutional permission wins out. Also in the 
mixed orthodox camp, Cheyney Ryan, Massimo Renzo, and David Estlund argue that 
combatants have institutional duties to obey the orders given to them by a legitimate state, which 
can exclude or override their interpersonal duties not to kill in unjust wars.25 
2.3 Concluding Remarks 
Second-order disagreements about the site of principles of jus in bello underpin first-order 
disputes over the moral equality of combatants and noncombatant immunity. The first-order 
dispute is a proxy battle, fought by theorists whose disagreements run much deeper. Orthodox 
just war theorists give more weight to institutional demands, and endorse either a political 
approach, or a mixed approach that is weighted towards the political; revisionist just war theorists 
give greater weight to interpersonal moral demands, and endorse either a non-political approach 
or a mixed approach which is weighted towards the non-political. For this debate is to make 
progress, we must settle the underlying second-order question. Otherwise just war theorists will 
talk past each other: political just war theorists might develop the most plausible account of the 
institutional norms governing war; non-political and mixed theorists might develop the most 
plausible versions of their own views; but their proposals would not strictly compete, because 
each presupposes an approach to the site of normative theorising that the others reject.  
3. The Site of Justice and Just War Theory: Implications  
We cannot here settle which approach to the site of justice is right. But we can identify the most 
important challenges facing political, non-political and mixed approaches to jus in bello, and 
gesture at possible responses to them. In doing so, we wish to prompt orthodox and revisionist 
theorists to more thoroughly defend the second order perspectives tacitly underpinning their first 
order views. The central question they all must answer is: insofar as we recognise both 
institutional and interpersonal moral demands, why does your approach—political, non-political, 
or mixed—describe the correct relationship between them?  
                                                 
21 Jeff McMahan, “The Morality of War and the Law of War,” in Just and Unjust Warriors : The Moral and Legal Status 
of Soldiers: The Moral and Legal Status of Soldiers, ed. David Rodin and Henry Shue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), 19–43. 
22 Cécile Fabre, “Guns, Food, and Liability to Attack in War,” Ethics 120, no. 1 (2009): 39. 
23 McMahan, “The Morality of War and the Law of War,” 37–38. 
24 Waldron, Torture, Terror, and Trade-Offs. 
25 David Estlund, “On Following Orders in an Unjust War,” Journal of Political Philosophy 15, no. 2 (June 1, 2007): 
213–34; Massimo Renzo, “Democratic Authority and the Duty to Fight Unjust Wars,” Analysis 73, no. 4 (October 1, 
2013): 668–76; Cheyney Ryan, “Democratic Duty and the Moral Dilemmas of Soldiers,” Ethics 122, no. 1 (2011): 10–
42.  
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3.1 Challenges to the Political Approach 
The political approach, in its purest form, states that one’s obligations in war are exhausted by 
the obligations set out by the morally justified laws of war. And as we have seen, for orthodox 
just war theorists subscribing to the political approach, justified laws of war include combatant 
equality and noncombatant immunity.  
The central challenge for the political approach is to explain why fundamental 
interpersonal moral demands—such as the prohibition on intentionally killing the innocent—
should be silenced or trumped by institutional demands. The challenge is relatively easily met for 
noncombatant immunity. After all, even the most ardent revisionists are uneasy about their views' 
radical implications for the permissibility of intentionally killing noncombatants. Everyone 
recognises the intuitive pull of noncombatant immunity. So if the political account vindicates that 
intuitive pull, then that is all to the good.  
Combatant equality poses a much more serious challenge. Nobody can plausibly deny 
that profound moral reasons weigh against intentionally killing people who are justifiably 
defending their lives and homes, and against collaterally killing wholly uninvolved people in the 
pursuit of an unjust objective. We ordinarily consider these the weightiest moral reasons that 
there are. Why should the presence of an institutional scheme that licenses such killings make any 
difference to their permissibility at all?  
To answer this question, political just-war theorists must account for the authority of 
international law. In other words, they must explain why the mere fact that some act is prohibited 
(or permitted, required etc.) by morally justified laws of war gives the addressees of these laws 
decisive reason not to do it, even if it would be permissible at the bar of interpersonal morality. 
This is a daunting task. Many political philosophers recognise that, even in the best states, 
accounting for the authority of domestic law is hard.26 And international society is a far cry from 
the ideal liberal state. Yet, short of a convincing account of the conditions under which 
international law has authority, and an argument showing that existing laws of war satisfy those 
conditions, the normative priority that the political approach assigns to institutional demands 
remains unvindicated.  
Perhaps one could adequately defend the authority of international law. But if political 
just war theorists fall short of that goal, they might still salvage their approach by lowering its 
ambitions. Instead of defending the authority of international law in toto, they could reinterpret it, 
so that the legal standards less obviously clash with interpersonal demands. They could argue that 
the morally justified laws governing resort to war should apply to combatants as well as to states 
and their leaders. Then combatants who fight unjust wars ought not to fight at all, according to 
both their institutional and interpersonal reasons. On this reading, the laws of jus in bello do not 
licence actions that obey them, but instead offer minimal standards that everyone should obey, 
given that they decide to fight. For just combatants, there might be no conflict between their 
interpersonal and institutional reasons. For unjust combatants, the laws of jus in bello do not 
licence their behaviour. The institutional permission is nested within a broader institutional 
prohibition: the morally justified laws of war should say to unjust combatants ‘don’t fight unjust 
wars; but if you fight them, then obey the jus in bello’.27  
However, this would amount to a revision of current international law, which explicitly 
grants combatants the permission to kill in war (in accordance with the laws of armed conflict) 
without adverse distinction based on their nature of their cause.28 International law does not 
enjoin individual combatants to fight only just wars. So, while the proposed solution might 
                                                 
26 For discussion see A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1979). 
27 This develops an idea of Dill and Shue, “Limiting the Killing in War”; Shue, “Laws of War, Morality, and 
International Politics.”  
28 Article 43.2 of the first additional protocol: combatants 'have the right to participate directly in hostilities'. 
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salvage the plausibility of the political approach to just war theory, it comes at the cost that 
political just war theorists must be less conservative in their attitude to international law.  
3.2 Challenges to the Non-Political Approach 
The non-political approach, recall, holds that the principles governing the design of the laws of 
war are derived from the principles governing the conduct of individual soldiers in conjunction 
with salient facts. On the simplest, purist version of this approach, the laws of war should mirror 
interpersonal morality. 29  We think that this view should be rejected because it would have 
disastrous results. On this point, we agree with orthodox theorists like Shue, and revisionists like 
McMahan. This links up with the broader topic of how feasibility constraints should impact on 
institutional design, which we address in the next section. 
A more sophisticated version of the non-political approach has been adopted in support 
of a broadly orthodox account of the laws of war. On this view, the existing laws of war are an 
imperfect attempt to approximate what interpersonal morality demands of individual combatants. 
As anticipated, this is the view of one of us, and Adil Haque.30 It says, first, that while combatant 
equality is strictly false as a general moral thesis, it is a sensible approximation of the moral truth. 
The moral protections that just combatants enjoy are somewhat less robust than those enjoyed 
by justified self-defenders in ordinary interpersonal conflicts—they have voluntarily exposed 
themselves to the risk of harm, moreover most of them go to war recklessly, without examining 
the justice of their cause. The protections enjoyed by unjust combatants are somewhat more 
robust than those of unjustified attackers in interpersonal conflicts—their epistemic position is 
typically the same as for just combatants; often they act out of reasonable partiality for their 
compatriots. Moreover, on each side of a war, many individual combatants fight permissibly, and 
many fight impermissibly—all wars involve just and unjust aims and, more narrowly, just and 
unjust operations. These facts together make the legal equality of combatants a sensible 
approximation of the moral truth, given how difficult it is to determine of any particular just or 
unjust combatant whether he is fighting permissibly or impermissibly. Similarly, manifold 
arguments show that killing noncombatants in war is more seriously wrongful than killing 
combatants, which, combined with further premises, helps ground noncombatant immunity and 
other legal doctrines, like proportionality and necessity. In particular, noncombatants are more 
vulnerable than combatants, killing them involves running a greater risk of killing innocent 
victims than does killing combatants, and killing noncombatants typically involves an egregiously 
wrongful mode of agency, in which they are used as a mere means.31 
Since the laws of war approximate interpersonal morality, for these orthodox-friendly 
proponents of the non-political approach, one’s interpersonal moral obligations and permissions 
trump any obligations and permissions grounded in the law.  
This approach faces two objections, from opposite perspectives. First, given the priority 
it grants interpersonal moral demands, the orthodox-friendly political approach construes the 
laws of war as entirely epiphenomenal. This gives those laws insufficient normative bite. Surely 
unjust combatants who abide by the laws of war are not morally on a par with equally unjust 
combatants who altogether disregard those laws? Non-political theorists, however, might be able 
to account for this intuition. They could point out that, when soldiers from different sides are 
symmetrically positioned with respect to the laws of war—in that they all endorse and follow 
them—their moral standing vis-à-vis each other changes. Suppose the soldiers of state A commit 
some interpersonal wrong in accordance with international law, but that the same international 
law is also endorsed and upheld by state B and its soldiers. If the latter subscribe to, endorse and 
uphold a system of law, they cannot simply treat the A-soldiers, who have acted in accordance 
                                                 
29 E.g., Rodin, “Morality and Law in War.” 
30 Lazar, Sparing Civilians: Moral Foundations of the Principle of Distinction; Haque, Morality and Law at War.  
31  These arguments are developed and defended in detail in Lazar, Sparing Civilians: Moral Foundations of the Principle of 
Distinction.  
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with that legal system, just as they would if the system did not exist. By following the common 
legal system that binds both A and B, B and its soldiers lack standing to condemn the morally 
wrongful actions of the A soldiers, given that they themselves follow the rules licensing those 
kinds of actions.32  
Crucially, once the assumption of symmetry is lifted, this conclusion no longer holds. To 
see this, if we now stipulate that—unlike A—B and its soldiers reject international law and 
directly act on the demands of interpersonal morality, the A-soldiers’ standing with respect to 
them becomes no different than it would be without international law. B would then indeed be 
entitled to metaphorically ‘point its finger at A’ and hold its soldiers to account for acting against 
the moral imperatives of interpersonal morality.  
Second, an objector might protest that the laws of war, which explicitly grant unjust 
combatants a permission to kill just combatants, and to inflict proportionate collateral deaths, 
could not possibly be seen as an approximation of combatants’ interpersonal moral demands. One 
way to respond is to advocate a change in the laws of war, similar to that required for political 
just war theory. The jus in bello should not grant unjust combatants an explicit licence to kill, as it 
does in article 43.2 of the first additional protocol. Instead, it should explicitly state that anybody 
who hopes to fight permissibly ought to adhere to these standards, but that adherence does not 
guarantee that one fights permissibly (though it will ensure that one does less wrong than one 
would by breaking the standards). Instead of being expressly permitted by the laws of armed 
conflict, on this view, participation in an unjust war should be decriminalised.  
3.3 Challenges to the Mixed Approach 
Finally, we turn to the mixed approach. The central difference between this and the non-political 
one is that, on the latter, the laws of war should mirror or approximate combatants’ interpersonal 
moral demands, while on the mixed approach the norms grounding the laws of war are quite 
different from those grounding interpersonal morality. Adherents of this approach think that the 
non-political alternative commits ‘the fallacy of approximation’.33 Our attempts to approximate 
interpersonal morality in the laws of war might have such disastrous consequences that we 
should instead develop principles to govern the laws of war that are quite distinct from those of 
interpersonal morality. As explained earlier, taking this kind of view, Jeff McMahan argues that 
the laws of war presuppose consequentialist foundations—they aim to minimise wrongful 
harm—while the morality of war is avowedly nonconsequentialist in structure.34  
The mixed view could potentially let us ‘have our cake and eat it too’: we can have our 
rigorist principles of interpersonal morality, without accepting their radical and deleterious 
implications if implemented in international law. But of course this view must now explain what 
soldiers should do when law and interpersonal morality conflict. McMahan briefly argues that, 
when morality requires what law permits or prohibits, and when morality prohibits what the law 
permits, soldiers should obey their moral reasons. But when the law prohibits what morality 
permits, combatants should adhere to the law. 35  Problematically, this discussion is neither 
                                                 
32 Interestingly, something similar is true of punishment: both ‘vertically’ and ‘horizontally.’ Vertically, it appears 
impermissible for a state to punish those bound by its rules for actions that do not contravene those rules—even if 
those rules are unjust from the perspective of interpersonal morality. Horizontally, it seems impermissible for 
individuals who all endorse and uphold the same less-than-just laws to condemn each other for doing so: since they 
all support the same legal system, it would be hypocritical for some to condemn others for acting in accordance with 
its injunctions. 
33 (Ref to Estlund MS–ask for permission) In economics, the theory of the second best governs cases when one 
or more optimality conditions for the application of some principle fails, the next best solution might involve 
changing or relaxing some of the other optimality conditions, rather than simply approximating the ideal case as 
closely as possible. See R. G. Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster, “The General Theory of Second Best,” Review of Economic 
Studies 24, no. 1 (1956): 11–32. 
34 McMahan, “The Morality of War and the Law of War.”  
35 Ibid., 37–38.  
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exhaustive (it is silent on legal requirements), nor theoretically grounded. McMahan never 
explains why legal demands can override moral ones, except by appealing to consequentialist 
considerations that clash with the deontological approach to interpersonal morality he otherwise 
endorses.36 
Advocates of the mixed account, like adherents of the political approach, must explain 
under what circumstances/in what domain the international law of armed conflict has authority. At 
least, they must do this if the laws of war are ever going to override combatants’ interpersonal 
moral demands. Otherwise, if an action is permitted, prohibited, or required by interpersonal 
morality, then it is permitted, prohibited, or required simpliciter, regardless of what international 
law says. The laws of armed conflict would be epiphenomenal to what combatants in war actually 
ought to do, and the mixed approach would collapse into the non-political one.  
For Waldron, Renzo, and others on the political side of the mixed camp, the central 
challenge is the same as for the political just war theorists: to explain why a legal permission, or 
the authoritative orders of a legitimate state, can override combatants' interpersonal obligations 
not to kill innocent people in pursuit of an unjust cause. 
 
3.4 Concluding Remarks 
Much of the dispute between orthodox and revisionist just war theorists depends on what the 
correct account of the relationship between institutional and interpersonal moral demands is. If 
orthodox theorists wish to vindicate combatant equality and non-combatant immunity, they must 
argue that the existing laws of war have legitimate authority, or that they successfully 
approximate/reflect interpersonal morality. Both tasks are hard to accomplish.  
If revisionists wish to uphold the interpersonal moral prohibition on killing the innocent, 
while not altogether denying the moral force of broadly justified laws of war, they must explain 
why and when obedience to the laws of war affects one’s moral standing. This again requires 
either developing a theory of the authority of international law or, more modestly, of the 
normative significance of international law, short of authority. The bottom line, however, is that 
progress in the first-order dispute between revisionist and orthodox just war theorists demands a 
re-orientation of the debate towards the second-order question of how institutional and 
interpersonal moral demands relate to each other.  
4. Feasibility Constraints and Just War Theory 
In this section, we first sketch the political theory discussion on feasibility constraints and the 
design of normative principles, then draw parallels with contemporary just war theory debate. 
Once again, this new framing will help us illuminate that debate and make some substantive 
advances within it. 
4.1 Feasibility Constraints in Political Theory 
When attempting to apply our moral and political theories to the real world, we often find that 
there are facts about human character and behaviour, our empirical circumstances, and the 
perverse incentives that we face, which make those theories hard to implement successfully. 
These facts are feasibility constraints. 37  Political theorists have, in recent years, expended much 
                                                 
36 McMahan, “The Morality of War and the Law of War”; Seth Lazar, “The Morality and Law of War,” in The 
Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law, ed. Andrei Marmor (New York: Routledge, 2012), 364–79. 
37 For discussion see Pablo Gilabert and Holly Lawford-Smith, “Political Feasibility: A Conceptual Exploration,” 
Political Studies 60, no. 4 (December 1, 2012): 809–25; Pablo Gilabert, “Feasibility and Socialism,” Journal of Political 
Philosophy 19, no. 1 (2011): 52–63; Holly Lawford-Smith, “Understanding Political Feasibility,” Journal of Political 
Philosophy 21, no. 3 (2013): 243–59; Anca Gheaus, “The Feasibility Constraint on The Concept of Justice,” The 
Philosophical Quarterly 63, no. 252 (2013): 445–64; Juha Räikkä, “The Feasibility Condition in Political Theory,” Journal 
of Political Philosophy 6, no. 1 (1998): 27–40. 
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effort identifying which feasibility constraints should set the parameters for principles of justice 
that aim to deliver action-guiding prescriptions. Their views can be represented on a spectrum, 
from utopian theorists at one end, to realists at the other.38  
Utopian theorists think that justice is unconstrained by the demands of feasibility; 39 
realists think that all facts that render a principle even minimally unlikely to be successfully 
realised should be taken as parametric. Between these unpopular extremes, many theorists believe 
that normative theorising should make some concessions to feasibility constraints, but they differ 
over the extent of those concessions. Borrowing a label introduced by David Estlund, we 
distinguish between minimally and maximally concessive approaches.40  
Minimally concessive approaches consider only a thin set of feasibility constraints 
relevant to theorizing about justice. Provided some action enjoined by a principle of justice is 
physically and psychologically possible for the agent, it can be required of him.41 Facts about 
physical and psychological possibility will depend on (i) the agents in question and (ii) the 
environment around them. Ascertaining what (i) and (ii) involve may seem relatively 
straightforward. For example, it is physically impossible for a deaf person to act on the obligation 
‘you ought to reply when your name is called out’. Similarly, it may be physically impossible for a 
well-meaning but desperately poor state to provide subsistence for all of its citizens.  
Other cases are less clear-cut. Imagine John is standing on the shore of a lake, and sees a 
small child drowning, not far from him.42 John knows how to swim, and can pull the child out 
without risking drowning; however, he is paralysed by what he recognises as an irrational fear of 
entering the lake. He developed this fear as a child, after his father died in a boating accident. Is it 
psychologically impossible for John to walk in and pull the child out? It is hard to say, but 
minimally concessive theories must explain when psychological debilities count as genuine 
feasibility constraints. 
Maximally concessive approaches emphasise not only facts about physical and 
psychological possibility, but also facts about what agents are likely to do given their preferences 
and dispositions.43 To appreciate the difference, consider this prescription: ‘Every person ought 
to donate 50% of their income to the global poor, provided this is compatible with each still 
satisfying their basic needs’. Minimally concessive approaches could not object to this: though 
this prescription asks a lot, it is clearly physically and psychologically possible to donate half one’s 
income to others (barring exceptional circumstances or unusual pathologies). By contrast, on the 
maximally concessive approach, this prescription is indeed invalid, because it is so unlikely that 
people will comply with it. Given predictable selfishness and partiality, very few will be disposed 
to donate so much of their earnings, which is enough to undermine the prescription.44  
                                                 
38 Laura Valentini, “Ideal vs. Non-Ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map,” Philosophy Compass 7, no. 9 (2012): 654–64. See 
also Joseph H. Carens, “Realistic and Idealistic Approaches to the Ethics of Migration,” International Migration Review 
30, no. 1 (April 1, 1996): 156–70. 
39 Arguably G.A. Cohen is such a theorist. See Cohen, “Facts and Principles.” 
40 David Estlund, Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008), 
chap. 14. 
41 David Estlund appears to be concerned with physical possibility alone, hence he arguably belongs somewhere in 
between utopian and minimally concessive approaches. David Estlund, “Human Nature and the Limits (If Any) of 
Political Philosophy,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 39, no. 3 (2011): 207–37. 
42 Cf. Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 1, no. 3 (1972): 229–43. Check 
w/CB about Gerhard’s case. 
43 For a critique of these approaches see Estlund, “Human Nature and the Limits (If Any) of Political Philosophy.” 
44 Some forms of so-called ‘realism in political theory’ may be seen as leaning towards this position. For discussion 
see William A. Galston, “Realism in Political Theory,” European Journal of Political Theory 9, no. 4 (2010): 385–411. 
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4.2 Feasibility Constraints in Just War Theory 
The divide between maximally and minimally concessive approaches is again reproduced in the 
split between orthodox and revisionist just war theorists, and in a rather stark way. The former 
are maximally concessive, the latter are minimally concessive. 
4.2.1 Maximally Concessive Just War Orthodoxy 
Orthodox theorists defend combatant equality and noncombatant immunity on maximally 
concessive grounds. The institutions governing armed conflict should not make demands that 
their addressees will predictably ignore. More specifically, some facts about warfare, human 
nature, and our predictable moral failings, make revisionist laws of war highly unlikely to be 
observed.45 
First, the circumstances of warfare mean that combatants are rarely able to find out, given 
the time and resources available, whether their cause is just, or whether their targets are liable to 
be killed. Moreover, there may be reasonable disagreement about what makes a war just, so 
different combatants’ judgements will presuppose different standards (Rawls’ ‘burdens of 
judgment’ apply here as elsewhere).46 And even if—counterfactually—most combatants could 
converge on the same standard of justice, find out whether the war they are fighting is just, and 
distinguish the liable from the nonliable, they would not be able to confine their attacks to the 
liable, given how the two groups are intermingled, and given how relatively indiscriminate 
military technology still is.  
Second, human nature is such that, arguably, the extreme exigencies of warfare make 
adhering to strict moral norms psychologically impossible for many combatants. Their own lives 
and the lives of their friends are immediately in danger; death and pain surround them; 
psychological trauma is, for many combatants, inevitable. This extreme stress reduces their 
cognitive ability to deliberate about the right course of action; it also almost certainly inclines 
them to reason more partially.  
Third, and perhaps most importantly, combatants will almost always convince themselves 
that they are fighting for a just cause, no matter how much of a cognitive leap that requires. Their 
leaders will aid this self-deception through propaganda, deceit, and misinformation.  
Together, these facts mean that if the laws of armed conflict rejected combatant equality 
and noncombatant immunity, then those laws would be, respectively, completely disregarded and 
brutally abused. If the law prohibits unjust combatants from fighting, they will fight nonetheless, 
whether because of the difficulty of knowing that their cause is unjust; or because, once their 
lives are at stake, they will predictably fight regardless of the justice of their cause; or because they 
convince themselves that their cause is just despite evidence to the contrary. Similarly, if the laws 
permit just combatants to intentionally kill liable noncombatants, they would predictably be 
abused. Many unjust combatants would arrogate to themselves the extra permissions reserved for 
just combatants (believing themselves justified), and many just combatants would take advantage 
of the additional permissions without adequate justification for doing so (in part, no doubt, 
because of the psychological exigencies of combat).  
If a critical mass of combatants disobey the laws of armed conflict, then those laws 
cannot minimise the wrongful harms involved in war. Laws cannot achieve their goals if 
they are ignored. So the laws should not make demands of people that they will, 
                                                 
45 Buchanan and Keohane, “The Preventive Use of Force”; Buchanan, “Institutionalizing the Just War”; Adam 
Roberts, “The Principle of Equal Application of the Laws of War,” in Just and Unjust Warriors: The Moral and Legal 
Status of Soldiers, ed. David Rodin and Henry Shue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 226–54; McMahan, “The 
Morality of War and the Law of War”; Henry Shue, “Laws of War,” in The Philosophy of International Law, ed. 
Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas (New York: OUP Oxford, 2010), 511–30; Shue, “Laws of War, Morality, and 
International Politics”; Waldron, Torture, Terror, and Trade-Offs.  
46 Rawls, Political Liberalism, Lecture II, sec. 2. 
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predictably, not fulfil. Facts about likely compliance constrain which institutions can 
justifiably govern armed conflict. Orthodox theorists are maximally concessive. 
4.2.2 Minimally Concessive Just War Revisionism 
As already noted, revisionists focus primarily on interpersonal moral demands, discussing 
institutions only in passing. And where those interpersonal demands are concerned, revisionists 
are minimally concessive, as well as highly optimistic about what is psychologically possible for 
combatants at war. For revisionists, the pervasive uncertainty of war, psychological trauma, and 
predictable self-deception are at most problems of application. Normative principles are derived 
from sanitised hypothetical cases with none of these characteristics. 
Faced with the objection that their normative theorising makes epistemic and 
psychological demands that normal combatants cannot meet, revisionists have a ready response: 
their demands govern whom combatants may kill, if they kill anyone. They can be satisfied either 
by killing only those who may permissibly be killed, or by not killing anyone at all. Although, for 
at least some combatants, it might be impossible to discriminate between the liable and the 
nonliable in war, it is certainly possible to adhere to the principle 'kill only the liable': simply kill 
no one.  
Moreover, although stress and trauma might undermine some people’s agency in war, 
many combatants overcome their circumstances to oppose unjust actions in war, so why should 
we assume that all humans are incapable of opposing wars that are unjust simpliciter? 
Revisionists believe, therefore, that (at least many) human beings can resist the corrupting effects 
of violence and war, and that, despite their survival instinct, they can adhere to norms that 
demand sacrificing their own lives, rather than take another person’s to protect themselves. Since 
resisting one’s survival instinct is undeniably hard, norms in opposition to that instinct are 
unlikely to be universally complied with. But for revisionists, predictable wrongdoing is no 
grounds for removing obligations we would otherwise have, at the level of interpersonal morality.  
5. Feasibility Constraints and Just War Theory: Implications  
As with the dispute over political and non-political approaches to the site of jus in bello, we again 
see that the controversy between orthodox and revisionist just war theorists derives from a 
deeper disagreement feasibility constraints in normative theorising. It is another proxy battle, 
which cannot be resolved without settling the second-order dispute. However, we think this task 
is easier for the feasibility question than for the site question, because the revisionist and 
orthodox approaches are not really at odds. Not only are they fighting proxy battles; they are 
engaged in a phony war. Why? Because there is no uniquely correct set of feasibility constraints.  
Which constraints we should recognise depends on the site for which we are issuing 
prescriptions. Orthodox and revisionist just war theorists—for all their disagreement—actually 
endorse compatible approaches, and each is broadly right about the role of feasibility for the site 
that they consider. Orthodox theorists are right that when designing institutions we should be 
maximally concessive. But revisionists are equally right that, at the level of interpersonal morality, 
we should be only minimally concessive.  
The key point is simple. When deciding what I, as an individual, ought to do, I cannot use 
my moral weakness as an excuse, because—setting genuine pathologies aside—I am in control of 
whether or not I am morally weak, and of how I behave more generally. By contrast, we cannot 
reasonably expect the same level of ‘control’ on the part of an institutional system, no matter 
how effectively enforced its rules are. It is not in the power of the law to secure compliance with 
its content, independent of what that content is. How likely individuals are to obey given rules 
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therefore makes a difference to what a system of rules can achieve in any given circumstance.47 
For this reason, institutional—as opposed to purely moral—rules for individual conduct ought, 
in the main, to take into account individuals’ likely non-compliance.  
While the maximally vs. minimally concessive attitudes of orthodox and revisionist just 
war theorists at the institutional and the interpersonal level are laudable, some objections to both 
views can be derived from thinking about feasibility constraints. In what follows, we set them out 
in turn. 
 
5.1 Challenges to Orthodox Theorists’ Treatment of Feasibility Constraints 
Orthodox theorists are arguably too concessive in their understanding of which institutional 
norms might win assent. For example, one might have thought, during the Second World War, 
that any legal convention prohibiting intentional attacks on noncombatants would be impossible 
to implement, and yet over the twentieth century attacks on noncombatants became taboo, at 
least among liberal democracies.48 In the same spirit, we should not be too pessimistic about the 
prospects for further reform of the laws of war. We should endorse and pursue concrete 
institutional proposals which might materially improve the likelihood of unjust combatants both 
finding out that their wars are unjust, and acting on that knowledge. 
Whatever the shortcomings of Jeff McMahan’s proposal for an international court of jus 
ad bellum, using advances in technology and the increasing reach of international organisations to 
provide more public information about the proximate causes of war (along the lines already 
attempted by the OSCE, for example in South Ossetia in 2008) increases combatants’ prospects 
of discovering whether their causes are just.49 Making greater provision within national armies for 
selective conscientious refusal could also materially diminish predictable voluntary wrongdoing.50 
New technologies, such as unmanned aerial vehicles equipped with high-powered cameras 
promise to make both distinguishing and discriminating between the liable and nonliable more 
tractable, as well as mitigating at least the antecedent psychological stress that makes 
conscientious action by soldiers in conventional wars so difficult. 51 Though international law 
advances glacially, it does advance, and orthodox just war theorists should ensure they guide, 
rather than hinder, that progress. 
 
5.2 Challenges to Revisionist Theorists’ Treatment of Feasibility Constraints 
Revisionist just war theorists are too inattentive to real-world constraints characterizing the 
human condition in war, and to uncertainty in particular. We can indeed always abide by the duty 
not to kill nonliable people, by simply refusing to fight, but this is like saying that a blind person 
can obey the prescription ‘you ought to cross roads only when the green man is lit’ by never 
crossing roads. If they give us no more guidance than this as to what to do given our uncertainty 
in war, then our only option is to endorse pacifism. 
Combatants at war are unable to reliably distinguish between liable and nonliable 
combatants and noncombatants; even if they could do so, they could not discriminate between 
them (that is, confine their attacks only to the liable ones).52 Invariably, they are also uncertain 
whether their cause is just, and whether it will be proportionate and necessary. If they are told 
                                                 
47 Note that, since what institutions can achieve is partly dependent on what individuals are likely to do, there is a 
sense in which we are still ‘non-concessive’ with respect to the feasibility constraints applying at the institutional level. 
(Weinberg/LV—still ms; probably CUP/OUP collection post Bowling Green workshop) 
48 Colin H. Kahl, “In the Crossfire or the Crosshairs? Norms, Civilian Casualties, and U.S. Conduct in Iraq,” 
International Security 32, no. 1 (2007): 7–46. 
49 Jeff McMahan, “The Prevention of Unjust Wars,” in Reading Walzer, ed. Yitzhak Benbaji and Naomi Sussmann 
(New York: Routledge, 2014), 233–56.  
50 Jeff McMahan, “The Moral Responsibility of Volunteer Soldiers,” Boston Review, 2013. 
51 Bradley Jay Strawser, “Moral Predators: The Duty to Employ Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles,” Journal of Military Ethics 
9, no. 4 (December 1, 2010): 342–68.  
52 Lazar, “The Responsibility Dilemma for Killing in War”; Dill and Shue, “Limiting the Killing in War.”  
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that they may kill only the liable, when doing so is necessary and proportionate to the service of a 
just cause, then their only way to be sure of complying with morality is to refuse to fight. 
Although pacifism should remain a live option, most just war theorists want to offer a middle 
ground between realism and pacifism, to explain why common sense is right, and some wars can 
permissibly be fought, despite their costs. This means explaining how to apply revisionist just war 
theory in the context of uncertainty.53  
Although one of us develops his own approach to the ethics of killing under uncertainty 
elsewhere, it is germane here to illustrate what the options are for revisionists who extend their 
theories in these ways.54 The first approach is to first identify all of the objective moral reasons, 
then choose a decision rule that allows us to optimise compliance with our objective moral 
reasons, given our uncertainty. Paradigmatically, this means applying decision theory to our moral 
reasons. For any given decision problem, we first identify the options available to the agent, then 
the possible states that the world might be in, and the outcomes of those options dependent on 
those states. We assign probabilities to the states, and utilities to the outcomes, sum the products 
of those two values for all possible outcomes from the option, and choose the option that 
maximises expected utility.  
On most accounts this is our best tool for decision-making under uncertainty, but it 
poses distinctive problems for just war theory, given its apparently consequentialist cast, and the 
avowedly nonconsequentialist approach to ethics of most just war theorists—certainly in the 
revisionist camp. It also raises its own problems—after all,  we aimed to provide useful advice in 
the circumstances of war, but doing expected utility calculations is often no easier than working 
out the objectively right thing to do. Identifying salient outcomes and states, assigning utilities to 
the outcomes and probabilities to the states will often be an inordinately complex task. Some 
might even question whether we can assign probabilities in an endeavour as unpredictable and 
complex as warfare. 
The second approach is to argue that first-order moral reasons govern what is permissible 
given our uncertainty—that is, we do not need a decision rule to optimise compliance with our 
objective moral reasons; on the contrary, our objective moral reasons can be understood in ways 
that make them action-guiding given our uncertainty. As an example, we might have reasons to 
give our friends the ‘benefit of the doubt’ when they need our help. Suppose you arrive at a bar 
and find your friend in a brawl. You have no idea who started the fight. Suppose that if you were 
trying to optimise compliance with your objective moral reasons, it would be wrong to intervene, 
because the risk of harming an innocent person outweighs the value of protecting your friend. 
And yet it seems intuitively plausible that, within a certain range of probabilities that your friend 
is not in the wrong, it is subjectively permissible to intervene, because you should give him the 
benefit of the doubt.  
Of course, we could analyse this idea by speaking about the objective reasons of 
friendship, which weigh against the risks of harming an innocent person. But there is a different 
interpretation which sees this as one among many first order reasons that apply to moral action 
under uncertainty (many others have to do, for example, with the permissibility of imposing 
risks). Similarly, consider Adil Haque’s suggestion that whether an action counts as an intentional 
killing can depend on the agent’s degree of belief that the target was liable to be killed.55 The 
challenge for those who favour this approach is to give a detailed account of those reasons, and 
to explain both why they cannot be simply integrated into the first approach, and what we should 
                                                 
53 Jeff McMahan has some rough advice that combatants are permitted to kill people when it is reasonable for them 
to presume that their targets are liable to be killed, and Cécile Fabre has alluded to a precautionary principle, which 
enjoins deferring from the use of lethal force when there is doubt as to the targets’ liability.  
54 Seth Lazar, “In Dubious Battle: Uncertainty and the Ethics of Killing,” n.d. 
55 Jeff McMahan, “Who Is Morally Liable to Be Killed in War,” Analysis 71, no. 3 (July 1, 2011): 544–59; Adil Haque, 
“Killing in the Fog of War,” Southern California Law Review 86, no. 1 (2012): 63–116.  
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do when our first-order reasons governing action under uncertainty must be combined with, or 
conflict with, our reasons to optimise compliance with objective norms. 
Lastly, revisionist just war theorists should re-examine their views on what counts as 
minimally concessive, especially the possibility that psychological stress and trauma could defeat 
obligations that we might otherwise have. The standing assumption is that the unique exigencies 
of war do not diminish the constraints that govern belligerent practice. But in other contexts, we 
often think of pathological psychological debilities as being, as Estlund puts it, ‘requirement-
blocking’.56 Of course, this is easier to explain when the requirements are, as in the drowning case 
above, positive requirements to aid others. In war, our central focus is on the ethics of killing, 
and it is hard to come up with cases outside of war in which a putative duty not to kill is blocked 
by the psychological stress faced by the duty-bearer.  
But the revisionists tell combatants fighting for an unjust cause that they are morally 
required to lay down their weapons, even if that means sacrificing their lives. Consider a terrified 
soldier, worn down by weeks or even months of near-misses, seeing his friends and enemies 
arbitrarily cut down one after the other, who now faces attack. It seems relatively easy to think of 
cases in which it is psychologically impossible for such an individual to lay down his arms and let 
himself be killed. And we can perhaps go further. Is it psychologically possible, in such a case, to 
do nothing to defend yourself? Grant the revisionists that mere fear for one’s life cannot block 
the requirement not to kill an innocent person. But could it perhaps block the requirement not to 
subject an innocent person to a certain level of risk? Perhaps the psychological impossibility of 
doing nothing might licence this combatant to spray suppressive fire in the direction of his 
adversaries, in the hopes of pinning them down and preventing them from dealing the decisive 
blow. We do not mean to present a decisive case for this solution here. But we do think just war 
theorists should think more carefully about cases like these, which illustrate how the 
psychological impossibility of adhering to some constraints might block their application in war.  
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have argued that revisionist and orthodox just war theorists have fought proxy 
battles: their first-order disagreements over substantive questions in just war theory—in 
particular combatant equality and noncombatant immunity—often derive from second-order 
disputes over the nature and purpose of just war theory. Bringing these debates to the surface 
shows both how these different camps have been talking past each other, and how we can both 
make advances in the debate and, possibly, also reconcile their views. In particular, we have 
argued that normative theorising about war should concern itself both with the grounds on 
which the institutions governing armed conflict are morally justified, and with the moral demands 
that apply to individual actors in war. The interesting question is how the two relate to each other, 
and in the paper we have mapped out the relevant possibilities, and their virtues and vices. We 
have also argued that implicit disputes over feasibility constraints have underpinned the orthodox 
approach’s concessive attitude to unjust combatants who fight despite their moral requirements 
‘as private persons’ not to, as well as the revisionists’ moral rigorism. In this dispute, we think a 
happy accommodation between revisionists and orthodox theorists should be possible: when 
designing institutions to govern war, we should consider all kinds of predictable non-compliance; 
in the principles governing individual actors, only physical and psychological impossibility should 
be parametric. Revisionists have not adequately adapted their theories to accommodate these 
considerations, but there is nothing to prevent them from doing so. And once they do, the gulf 
between their prescriptions and those issued by orthodox theorists may shrink. 
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